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Abstract  Mental  health  theory  and  practice  are  in  a  state  of  signiﬁcant  ﬂux.  This  theoret-
ical article  places  the  position  taken  by  the  British  Psychological  Society  Division  of  Clinical
Psychology  (DCP)  in  the  context  of  current  practice  and  seeks  to  critically  examine  some  of
the key  factors  that  are  driving  these  transformations.  The  impetus  for  a  complete  overhaul
of existing  thinking  comes  from  the  manifestly  poor  performance  of  mental  health  services  in
which those  with  serious  mental  health  problems  have  reduced  life  expectancy.  It  advocates
using the  advances  in  our  understanding  of  the  psychological,  social  and  physical  mechanisms
that underpin  psychological  wellbeing  and  mental  distress,  and  rejecting  the  disease  model  of
mental distress  as  part  of  an  outdated  paradigm.  Innovative  research  in  genetics,  neuroscience,
psychological  and  social  theory  provide  the  platform  for  changing  the  way  we  conceptualise,
formulate  and  respond  to  psychological  distress  at  both  community  and  individual  levels.
© 2014  Asociación  Espan˜ola  de  Psicología  Conductual.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.  All
rights reserved.
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¿El  ﬁn  de  pensar  en  enfermedad  mental?
Resumen  La  teoría  y  la  práctica  de  la  salud  mental  se  encuentran  en  un  momento  de  cam-
bios signiﬁcativos.  El  objetivo  de  este  artículo  teórico  es  mostrar  la  posición  adoptada  por  la
British Psychological  Society  Division  of  Clinical  Psychology  (DCP)  en  el  contexto  de  la  práctica
actual, tratando  de  analizar  de  forma  crítica  algunos  de  los  factores  clave  que  impulsan  estos
cambios. La  necesidad  de  una  revisión  completa  de  los  planteamientos  actuales  procede  del
mal funcionamiento  de  los  servicios  de  salud  mental  en  los  que  las  personas  con  graves  prob-
lemas de  salud  mental  han  reducido  la  esperanza  de  vida.  Se  aboga  por  el  uso  de  los  avances
en los  conocimientos  de  los  mecanismos  psicológicos,  sociales  y  físicos  que  sustentan  el  bien-
estar psicológico  y  la  angustia  mental,  rechazando  el  modelo  de  enfermedad  de  la  ésta  como
parte de  un  paradigma  obsoleto.  Los  avances  de  la  investigación  en  genética,  neurociencia,
∗ Corresponding author. University of Brighton, Brighton, BN2 4AT, United Kingdom.
E-mail address: dcpukchair@gmail.com (R. Pemberton).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijchp.2014.05.003
697-2600/© 2014 Asociación Espan˜ola de Psicología Conductual. Published by Elsevier España, S.L. All rights reserved.
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psicología  y  teoría  social  proporcionan  la  plataforma  para  cambiar  la  manera  en  que  concep-
tualizamos,  formulamos  y  respondemos  al  sufrimiento  psicológico,  tanto  a  nivel  comunitario
como individual.
©  2014  Asociación  Espan˜ola  de  Psicología  Conductual.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.  Todos
los derechos  reservados.
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hThere  is  a  powerful  movement  in  train,  which  is  seeing
old  ideas  in  mental  health  being  replaced  as  new  scien-
tiﬁc  advances,  including  in  epigenetics  (Toyokawa,  Uddin,
Koenen,  &  Galea,  2012),  neuroscience  (for  example  in  child
development)  (Riem  et  al.,  2013)  and  psychological  under-
standing  of  cognitive  mechanisms  underlying  mental  distress
(Susan  &  Edward,  2011).  Mental  health  is  increasingly  under-
stood  as  a  public  health  issue  (World  Health  Organisation,
2010)  and  research  on  income  inequality  has  clearly  shown
the  link  with  expressions  of  mental  distress  (Wilkinson  &
Pickett,  2010).  This  paper  addresses  one  aspect  of  this
change,  in  which  we  advocate  abandoning  the  outdated  ‘dis-
ease  model’  of  mental  distress  and  the  development  of  new
ways  in  which  we  can  bring  together  all  the  elements  of  a
person’s  experience  in  order  to  help  them  most  effectively,
and  follows  the  publication  by  the  Division  of  Clinical  Psy-
chology  of  the  British  Psychological  Society  on  classiﬁcation
of  behaviour  (Awenat  et  al.,  2013).
The United Kigdom context
Due  to  the  impact  of  austerity  on  communities  and  ser-
vices  across  the  whole  of  the  Unted  Kingdom,  mental  health
services  are  under  severe  stress  and  increased  pressure.
The  governments  programme  of  ‘health  service  liberation’
(Department  of  Health,  2010)  has  changed  the  way  that
services  are  funded.  Power  has  shifted  to  doctors  working
in  community  settings  and  away  from  centralised  decision-
making.  The  people  who  use  services  have  been  put  at  the
heart  of  policy  making  and  every  other  part  of  the  system
is  being  told  that  there  is  to  be  ‘‘no  decision  about  me
without  me’’.  Budgets  for  social  care  have  been  dramati-
cally  reduced  and  mental  health  service  funding  has  been
curtailed.  The  traditional  near  monopoly  of  the  National
Health  Service  is  being  replaced  by  a  much  more  mixed  econ-
omy  of  providers.  Many  services  are  being  put  out  to  tender
and  are  starting  to  be  provided  by  Non-Governmental  Orga-
nisations  (NGO’s)  and  private  for  proﬁt  companies.  These
changes  have  been  highly  problematic  but  also  have  resulted
in  signiﬁcant  challenges  to  historic  patterns  of  practice  and
have  brought  forward  new  providers  and  new  ways  of  work-
ing.  The  government  agenda  of  ‘Parity  of  Esteem’  which  is
designed  to  increase  equity  of  resources  between  mental
and  physical  health  care  services  has  helpfully  highlighted
the  very  signiﬁcant  reduction  in  life  expectancy  for  peo-
ple  very  serious  mental  health  difﬁculties  (Royal  College  of
Psychiatry,  2013).
There  has  been  a  consistent  demand,  by  those  who
experience  distress,  for  more  psychologically  based  mental
a
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pealth  care  (Hicks  et  al.,  2011).  In  England  this  has  resulted
n  a  new  programme  of  psychologically  driven  care.  More
eople  are  now  seen  in  the  improving  access  to  psychologi-
al  therapies  programme  (IAPT)  than  are  seen  in  secondary
ental  health  care  (IAPT,  2012).  This  programme  has  in  large
art  been  lead  by  Clinical  Psychology.  The  programme  was
nitially  for  people  with  anxiety  and  depression  in  the  com-
unity  but  has  since  developed  a  range  of  service  redesign
rms  into  the  areas  of  psychosis,  long  term  physical  con-
itions,  and  mental  health  services  for  children  and  young
eople.
The  service  user  and  recovery  movements  have  been
aining  political  strength  and  maturity  (Centre  for  Mental
ealth,  2003).  Peer  recovery  workers  and  recovery  colleges
re  becoming  commonplace.  In  the  latter  you  do  not  need  to
ake  on  the  identity  of  a  patient  to  receive  support  and  guid-
nce  to  manage  whatever  the  issue  that  is  causing  concern
nd  distress.  The  whole  basis  of  expert  professional  practice
nd  power  is  being  questioned  in  new  and  challenging  ways.
he Diagnostic and Statistical Manual version
 (DSM-5) debate
he  recent  DCP  contribution  to  the  debate  concerning  DSM-5
Awenat  et  al.,  2013)  has  been  to  release  a  statement  calling
or  a  very  different  approach;  one  that  does  not  deny  the
mportance  of  biology  and  physical  factors  but  which  calls
nto  question  the  extent  to  which  disease  based  models  have
ed  us  up  a  conceptual  and  practice  blind  alley.  The  intro-
uction  to  the  statement  says.  ‘The  DCP  is  of  the  view  that  it
s  timely  and  appropriate  to  afﬁrm  publicly  that  the  current
lassiﬁcation  system  as  outlined  in  DSM  and  the  International
lassiﬁcation  of  Diseases  (ICD),  in  respect  of  the  functional
sychiatric  diagnoses,  has  signiﬁcant  conceptual  and  empir-
cal  limitations,  consequently  there  is  a  need  for  a  paradigm
hift  in  relation  to  the  experiences  that  these  diagnoses
efer  to,  towards  a  conceptual  system  which  is  no  longer
ased  on  a  ‘disease’  model’.
The  statement  needs  to  be  read  in  the  context  of  the  DCP
ood  practice  guidance  on  the  use  of  psychological  formu-
ation  (DCP,  2011).  This  guidance  states  that  psychological
ormulation  starts  from  the  assumption  that  ‘at  some  level
t  all  makes  sense’.  From  this  perspective  mood  swings,
earing  voices,  having  unusual  beliefs  can  all  be  understood
s  psychological  reactions  to  current  and  past  life  experi-
nces  and  events.  They  can  be  rendered  understandable  in
he  context  of  an  individual’s  particular  life  history  and  the
ersonal  meaning  that  they  have  constructed  about  it  and
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ithin  their  cultural  context.  While  this  assumption  in  any
ndividual  case  may  turn  out  to  need  review,  it  provides  a
ealthy  starting  point.
Illustrating  the  sea  changes  in  thinking  in  this  ﬁeld,  a
ecent  paper  (Forgeard  et  al.,  2011)  records  the  discussions
f  a  distinguished  group  of  American  researchers  and  prac-
itioners  (Aaron  Beck,  Richard  Davidson,  Fritz  Henn,  Steven
aier,  Helen  Mayberg,  and  Martin  Seligman)  concerning  the
urrent  understanding  of  depression  and  how  people  who
xperience  this  condition  can  best  be  helped.  One  contrib-
tor,  Steven  Maier’s  summed  up  the  view:  ‘‘We  need  to  get
id  of  our  current  categories  because  they  do  not  inform  us
bout  the  best  way  to  treat  people’’.
They  took  to  some  degree  as  a  starting  point  the  US
ational  Institute  for  Mental  Health’s  current  Strategic  Plan
Insel,  2008)  which  has  laid  down  the  challenge  of  bring-
ng  together  the  current  scientiﬁc  understanding  of  brain
nd  mind  with  practice,  something  it  regards  as  sadly  lack-
ng  at  present  with  the  contemporary  diagnostic  framework.
orgeard  et  al.  (2011)  report  that  ‘‘despite  decades  of
esearch  on  the  etiology  and  treatment  of  depression,  a
igniﬁcant  proportion  of  the  population  is  affected  by  the
isorder,  fails  to  respond  to  treatment  and  is  plagued  by
elapse’’  (p.  1).  This  fact,  together  with  the  relatively  poor
reatment  success  of  any  therapy,  is  referred  to  by  Seligman
2011)  as  ‘The  dirty  little  secret  of  drugs  and  therapy’  (p.  45)
s  part  of  the  recurring  theme  of  the  problem  of  using  the
urrent  classiﬁcation  system,  rather  than  one  which  looks
t  how  brains,  minds  and  people  (not  forgetting  people  are
ocial)  work.
It is  useful  here  to  quote  the  NIMH  2008  strategic  plan
Insel,  2008)  to  be  clear  what  a  fundamental  change  is  being
rticulated:
‘‘The  urgency  of  this  cause  cannot  be  over-stated.  The
President’s  New  Freedom  Commission  on  Mental  Health,
which  examined  the  need  for  reform  of  the  mental
health  care  system,  concluded  that  the  problems  of
frag-  mentation,  access,  and  quality  of  mental  health
care  were  so  great  that  nothing  less  than  transforma-
tion  would  sufﬁce.  With  several  large-scale  clinical  trials
completed  by  NIMH,  we  can  add  that  for  too  many  peo-
ple  with  mental  disorders  even  the  best  of  current  care  is
not  good  enough.  To  fully  address  these  issues,  we  must
continue  to  (a)  discover  the  fundamental  knowledge
about  brain  and  behavior  and  (b)  use  such  discover-
ies  to  develop  better  tools  for  diagnosis,  preemptive
interventions,  more  effective  treatments,  and  improved
strategies  for  delivering  services  for  those  who  provide
direct  mental  health  care.  These  activities  point  toward
NIMH’s  ultimate  goal,  which  is  not  merely  to  reduce
symptoms  among  persons  with  mental  illness,  but  also
to  promote  recovery  among  this  population  and  tangibly
improve  their  quality  of  life’’  (p.  iii)’’.
And  further  on:
‘‘Currently,  the  diagnosis  of  mental  disorders  is  based
on  clinical  observation----identifying  symptoms  that  tend
to  cluster  together,  determining  when  the  symptoms
appear,  and  determining  whether  the  symptoms  resolve,
recur,  or  become  chronic.  However,  the  way  that  men-
tal  disorders  are  deﬁned  in  the  present  diagnostic
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system  does  not  incorporate  current  information  from
integrative  neuroscience  research,  and  thus  is  not  opti-
mal  for  making  scientiﬁc  gains  through  neuroscience
approaches.  It  is  difﬁcult  to  deconstruct  clusters  of  com-
plex  behaviors  and  attempt  to  link  these  to  underlying
neurobiological  systems.  Many  mental  disorders  may  be
considered  as  falling  along  multiple  dimensions  (e.g.,
cognition,  mood,  social  interactions),  with  traits  that
exist  on  a  continuum  ranging  from  normal  to  extreme’’
(p.  9).
he need for a paradigm shift
he  DCP  call  for  a  paradigm  shift  is  not  a denial  of  the
mbodied  nature  of  human  experience  or  the  complex  rela-
ionship  between  social,  psychological  and  biological  factors
ut  instead  calls  for  a  system  that  acknowledges  the  grow-
ng  evidence  of  psychosocial  causal  factors  in  many  types  of
ental  distress.
To speak  of  a  paradigm  shift  could  be  seen  as  something  of
 cliché.  However,  we  have  used  this  term  very  deliberately
s  it  does  sum  up  the  pivotal  moment  we  ﬁnd  ourselves  in;
ut  the  necessary  change  is  not  inevitable,  and  the  form
f  change  may  or  may  not  be  the  one  we  would  envis-
ge.  Such  is  the  nature  of  paradigms.  In  the  very  successful
ook  on  science  Chalmers  (2013)  gives  a  very  useful  account
f  the  debates  which  surround  the  ideas  of  how  science
rogresses  and  the  meaning  of  scientiﬁc  facts.  The  contem-
orary  assumptions  concerning  mental  distress--for  example
he  serotonin  deﬁcit  theory  of  depression--are  deeply  rooted
n  the  minds  of  mental  health  professionals.  The  idea  that
epression  and  other  diagnoses  are  real  things  is  simi-
arly  strongly  believed.  This  is  similar,  in  our  view,  to  the
ssumptions  that  the  earth  was  the  centre  of  the  universe
n  pre-Copernican  days.  There  was  much  to  commend  the
dea--the  sun  rose  in  the  morning  and  set  at  night  and  clearly
ent  round  the  earth.  Critiques  of  these  ways  of  reasoning,
ogether  with  the  vested  interests  in  maintaining  the  cur-
ent  views  of  mental  disorder  (Goldacre,  2009,  2012)  have
hown  how  important  the  required  change  is.  Our  account  is
nly  one  aspect--another  example  which  Goldacre  has  been
dvocating  is  the  Alltrials  project  (www.alltrials.net)  aiming
o  provide  at  last  an  honest  account  of  the  effectiveness  of
rug  and  other  therapies.
A  DCP  project  entitled  ‘Beyond  psychiatric  diagnosis’
ims  to  outline  the  ﬁrst  principles  of  an  evidence-based
onceptual  alternative  to  psychiatric  diagnosis  which  will
rovide  a  more  effective  basis  for  reducing  complexity  by
rouping  similar  types  of  experience  together.  While  biol-
gy  plays  a  mediating  role  in  all  human  experiences,  mental
istress  is  not  best  understood  as  disease  process,  and  this
articular  paradigm  has  comprehensively  failed  in  the  ﬁeld
f  psychiatry.  Rather  than  assuming  that  human  thoughts,
eelings  and  behaviours  can  be  theorised  in  the  same  way  as
ody  parts,  the  project  will  draw  on  the  large  body  of  knowl-
dge  about  psychosocial  causal  factors  in  mental  distress.  It
ill  describe  the  ﬁrst  steps  towards  identifying  patterns  and
athways  which  can  be  used  to  inform  the  co-construction
f  individual  narratives  and  formulations  based  on  personal
eaning.  This  will  provide  a  sounder  and  more  productive
asis  for  developing  interventions,  carrying  out  research,
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planning  services  and  empowering  service  users  to  make
changes  in  their  lives.  It  will  also  have  implications  for  social
policy  and  issues  of  social  justice.
Another  approach  which  may  have  merit  comes  from  so-
called  ‘transdiagnostic’  models  (Dudley,  Kuyken,  &  Padesky,
2011).  These  argue  that  we  can  begin  to  make  sense  of  an
individuals  distress  through  an  understanding  of  underlying
psychological  mechanisms.  Rather  than  starting  with  a  set
of  symptoms  and  trying  to  ﬁnd  a  way  in  which  they  hang
together,  it  sets  out  to  explore  how  a  particular  psychologi-
cal  experience  is  mediated  across  many  different  diagnostic
groups.  Poletti  and  Sambataro  (2013)  for  example,  have
looked  at  how  delusional  ideas  function  from  a  cognitive  and
neuropsychological  perspective  in  schizophrenia,  bipolar
disorder,  major  depressive  disorder  and  neurological  disor-
ders  stroke,  and  neurodegenerative  diseases.  Here  there  is
a  clear  account  of  an  experience  which  can  lead  to  con-
siderable  distress  and  anxiety  and  an  understanding  of  the
underlying  mechanisms  and  possible  ways  to  help  alleviate
the  problem.
Seligman  (2014)  takes  this  further,  and  in  a  discussion
of  transdiagnostic  models  uses  the  example  of  smallpox
to  show  that  before  Jenner  discovered  that  there  was  an
infective  agent,  it  was  simply  a  description  of  symptoms.
Afterwards  there  was  a  mechanism--the  germ  theory.  He
makes  the  point  that  this  was  a  landmark  change--and  led  to
a  paradigm  shift  in  understanding  infectious  diseases  and
their  treatment.  He  goes  on  to  say  about  mental  health
diagnostic  systems  however:
‘‘The  underlying  processes  are  therein  called
‘‘transdiagnostic.’’  Transdiagnostic  of  what?
‘‘Transdiagnostic’’  assumes  that  the  disorders  have
a  reality  that  is  illuminated  by  these  processes.  But  this
puts  the  cart  before  the  horse.  In  a  post-Jenner  world,
what  is  real  are  the  underlying  processes  and  what
are  mere  way  stations  (ﬁctions?)  are  the  ‘‘disorders.’’
‘‘Comorbid’’  smacks  of  just  the  same  anachronism.  Two
diagnostic  categories,  mere  congeries  of  symptoms,  are
‘‘comorbid’’  if  they  share  the  same  underlying  process.
But  if  it  is  the  underlying  process  that  is  real,  and  the
‘‘disorders’’  convenient  way  stations  to  the  process,
‘‘comorbid’’  vanishes  into  thin  air’’  (p.  2).
What then is  the way forward?
Kinderman  (2013)  has  cogently  argued  that  we  need  aban-
don  the  disease  model  and  adopt  a  psychosocial  model  in
its  place.  He  argues  that  we  need  to  stop  diagnosing  non-
existent  illness.  In  the  place  of  diagnosis  we  need  to  base
planning  for  individuals  and  services  on  a  simple  list  of  peo-
ple’s  difﬁculties  and  to  recognize  our  primary  role  lies  in
supporting  their  wellbeing.  Despite  its  many  limitations  the
positive  psychology  movement  (Seligman,  2011)  is  correct
in  its  assertion  that  we  have  been  overly  preoccupied  with
deﬁcits  and  deﬁciencies  and  that  we  need  to  approach  psy-
chologically  distress  by  building  on  peoples  strengths.  We
need  to  signiﬁcantly  reduce  our  ever-increasing  reliance
on  psychotropic  medication  and  instead  offer  redesigned
psychosocial  services  than  aim  for  recovery  and  personal
agency.219
From  yet  another  perspective  the  World  Health  Organisa-
ion  International  Study  of  Schizophrenia  (ISOS)  on  recovery
mong  people  given  a  diagnosis  of  schizophrenia  is  also
nstructive  (Hopper,  Harrison,  Janca,  &  Sartorius,  2007;
ason,  Harrison,  Croudace,  Glazebrook,  &  Medley,  1997;
ason,  Harrison,  Glazebrook,  &  Medley,  1996).  This  research
ound,  contrary  to  expectations,  much  better  recovery  rates
n  less  developed  (by  which  you  could  perhaps  read  less
rescribing  and  western  psychiatric  approaches)  than  in  so
alled  ‘advanced’  countries.  This  work  has  never  been  satis-
actorily  absorbed  by  the  mental  health  system  in  the  United
igdom  but  it  provides  another  strong  evidence-based  chal-
enge  to  the  contemporary  approaches.
Whitaker  (2010),  a  science  journalist  has  made  a  study
f  the  impact  of  the  way  we  currently  provide  services,  and
xtensively  quotes  from  the  ISOS  studies:  He  provides  chap-
er  and  verse  that  in  the  United  States,  and  probably  also  in
he  United  Kingdom  there  is  a mental  health  epidemic--a
ublic  health  problem  largely  caused  by  the  system  we
ave  in  place.  He  also  describes  some  services  that  seem  to
aking  real  progress  in  putting  some  innovative  and  ground-
reaking  ideas  into  practice.  One  of  these  is  based  in  West-
rn  Lapland  and  is  called  Open  Dialogue  and  it  has  recently
een  introduced  in  the  UK  (Open  Dialogue,  2014).  This
pproach  draws  on  a number  of  theoretical  models,  includ-
ng  systemic  family  therapy,  dialogical  theory  and  social
onstructionism  and  has  echoes  of  some  very  early  work  on
risis  intervention  in  the  United  Kingdom  (Scott,  1973).
onclusions
ental  Health  theory  and  practice  is  at  a  crossroads.  The
anguage  and  categories  we  use  to  to  describe  psycholog-
cal  distress  are  changing  and  as  evidenced  by  the  furore
ver  DSM-5  are  being  challenged  from  all  sides.  The  complex
nterplay  between  the  physical,  the  psychological,  the  social
nd  cultural  is  always  likely  to  be  controversial  and  prone  to
hange.  We  however  have  argued  that  it  is  time  that  the  cur-
ent  disease-based  systems  are  replaced.  We  advocate  using
he  advances  in  our  understanding  of  the  psychological,
ocial  and  physical  mechanisms  that  underpin  psychological
ellbeing  and  mental  distress  to  change  the  way  we  respond
t  a  community  an  individual  level.  These  new  insights  need
o  be  incorporated  into  practice  and  research.  Central  to  the
ay  we  move  forward  will  be  the  role  and  power  of  people
xperiencing  mental  health  difﬁculties.  As  McKnight  (1995)
ays  ‘‘Revolutions  begin  when  people  who  are  deﬁned  as
roblems  achieve  the  power  to  redeﬁne  the  problem’’  (p.
6).  We  need  to  be  careful  that  we  don’t  just  replace  dis-
ase  based  frameworks  with  overly  restrictive  psychological
nes.  Success  will  include  social  inclusion  in  the  local  com-
unity,  friendships  within  and  outside  of  the  mental  health
ystem,  and  purpose  in  life.
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